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Introduction
In this thesis, I will argue that the most fundamental tendencies that govern
human nature are compassion and pride, since the former exists inherently and
undeniably between people and the latter arises inevitably upon the formation of
communities. I will posit that these tendencies have important implications for the role of
a legitimate government. Next, I will explain why government is only legitimate insofar
as it functions to facilitate the political engagement of its citizens. I will then argue that
political engagement is constituted by the proper manifestation of compassion and
pride, and it is conditioned by these. Thus, it must be the role of a legitimate
government to cultivate the right kind of compassion and pride in its citizens.
I will begin by presenting various accounts of human nature by a few of the most
foundational political theorists—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Aristotle. Each provides
a different justification for the existence of government based on his different views on
human nature. The three State of Nature theorists explain the formation of society on
the basis of necessity, while Aristotle believes political association to be fundamental to
what it means to be human. Of these views on human nature, I argue that Rousseau’s
is the most convincing because his is the only one that takes compassion to be a
motivator for human action, while the others believe self-preservation to be man’s only
intrinsic drive. I will characterize compassion, explain how it conditions selfpreservation, and then show how it is inherent within people. I will then discuss pride,
the way it develops, and how it can positively manifest itself. The first part of this thesis
will conclude with the assertion that compassion and pride are fundamental to human
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nature, and that human nature is not something to be feared and constrained by
government, but rather something to be cherished and allowed to thrive.
Next, I will argue that since governments are derived from the will of the people,
the legitimacy of a government depends on its ability to adequately represent the will of
its citizens. I maintain that one’s will cannot be delegated or mediated, so the only way
for a state to achieve this is to encourage the political action of each and every citizen.
The most effective form of government for enacting this is a direct democracy, which is
a system that allows citizens to engage directly with the decision-making process and
therefore stake a personal claim to the state. Then I will present a criticism of direct
democracy by discussing the trial of Socrates. I will conclude this section of the essay
by arguing that a government that does not reflect the nature and will of its citizens is
illegitimate.
Throughout this piece, I will assert the importance of pride and compassion in
political activity. The former drives political engagement because people generally work
and care for things that they feel pride in. The latter directs this political engagement
toward the proper ends. It encourages people to think of one another, not just
themselves, when making decisions and it also tempers some of the destructive
potential of pride. This leads me to make the claim that a properly developed sense of
pride for ones state and a keen sense of compassion for others form the basis for
meaningful political action.
In short, the legitimacy of a state depends on its ability to reflect the will and
nature of its citizens. The only way for a state to reflect the will and nature of its citizens
is through widespread political engagement. Since political engagement is conditioned
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by pride and compassion, I conclude that it must be the role of a legitimate government
to encourage and cultivate these two fundamental aspects of human nature.

Part One

Section A: The Makings of a Legitimate State
To determine what the role of a legitimate government is, and what
responsibilities it has to its people, one must first examine how that government came to
be and where it receives its legitimacy. To understand the roots of government is to
glimpse at the intended relationship between the citizen and the state, for it is from
within the citizens, the common people, that a just government arises. Beginning as
early as antiquity, political theorists have sought to justify the authority of government
within society and to explain how it came to be. Most tend to believe that the
development of government occurred simultaneously and inevitably with the combining
of people into communities. To some, such as Aristotle, to form political associations is
to embrace an essential aspect of human nature, which is communally oriented. To
others, like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, societies and their governments exist to
provide a higher standard of living for their people, and to encourage or facilitate
harmony. Both schools of thought lend themselves to the belief that that government,
which will be referred to here as the state, is both aimed at some good and derives its
legitimacy from its constituents. After all, no one would voluntarily consent to a condition
somehow worse than their previously existing one.
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I would posit that insofar as the state is the culmination of the wills of its citizens,
it should have no authority beyond these. Furthermore, the only legitimate form of
government is the one which directly and precisely embodies the natures and desires of
its citizens. The political engagement of citizens is key to achieving such a government.
Their wills cannot be delegated to others, but rather each citizen must stake his own
claim to the political life of the state if there is to be any hope of adequate
representation. Delegation, as it occurs within a republic or any other representative
government, strips the citizen of his most essential right and negates the very purpose
of his citizenship: the right to have his will heard and then reflected within his state. The
only adequate representation is self-representation. The only legitimate government
must therefore be a direct democracy because this is the only government in which the
people are free to engage in politics without constraint of any kind, and in which their
prideful and compassionate nature is harnessed and allowed to thrive.

Section B: The State of Nature Theorists (and Aristotle)
Thomas Hobbes was the first to address the issue of government legitimacy by
discussing it in terms of its inception. What made people found societies, and more
importantly, what made people decide to form governments to lead them? In his
Leviathan, he created a theoretical world called the ‘State of Nature’ in which humans
existed prior to any notion of government. This is a state of absolute freedom, in which
mankind is free to act in whichever way he chooses. Hobbes believes that given this
freedom, people are inclined to act solely out of self-preservation and embrace their
most basic instincts, which he believes to be violent and distrustful. His State of Nature

Cree 5
is one of “continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.”1 The Hobbesian depiction of man in his most natural state is
that of a savage, self-interested beast; unintelligent and governed by fear. This depiction
is paired with a conception of man as an animalistic slave to Nature; he acts in
accordance with his instincts and every one of his actions is aimed at his survival. In this
state, mankind is pitted against itself in a perpetual battle for supremacy. To Hobbes,
societies originate as a way of achieving peace in what would otherwise be a world
plagued by constant violence and anxiety.
Central to Hobbes’ conceptualization of man within the State of Nature is that he
has no idea of a summum bonum, or the “highest good”. This is because any notions of
good or evil amount to nothing more than an individual’s appetites or desires, or his
natural tendencies to move toward or away from certain things. If one were to come up
with a summum bonum, his would undoubtably be at odds with someone else’s, since
different people desire different things at different times. While there can be no shared
summum bonum, there can be a shared summum malum, or “greatest evil”. This is the
“Feare of death”2, which every person experiences in common within the State of
Nature. This fear, along with reason, leads mankind out of the despicable conditions of
Nature and into the less anxious conditions of society, wherein their freedoms are
curtailed by an unquestioned and unchangeable authority. It would appear that Hobbes
considers the relinquishment of ones liberty, and even his free will, to be justified in the
interest of escaping Nature and obtaining peace.
1

Hobbes, Thomas, Richard Tuck, Raymond Geuss, and Quentin Skinner. Hobbes: "Leviathan"
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print. 89.
2

Hobbes. 90.
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John Locke, who wrote a century later than Hobbes, was also involved in
explaining the legitimacy of government, and society on a whole, through his own
conception of the State of Nature. Similarly to Hobbes, Locke believed that within this
state of absolute freedom there would be constant conflict between people over
resources and survival. But this state is not all bad to him. This is because in this state
each individual can experience true liberty in a way that he cannot within society. Locke
considers this liberty fundamental to human nature and he cherishes this aspect of the
State of Nature. In his Second Treatise of Government he writes:
In the state of nature, liberty consists of being free from any
superior power on Earth. People are not under the will or
lawmaking authority of others but have only the law of nature for
their rule.3

It is only within the State of Nature that one can be free of any and all forces of coercion
or dominance. He need not submit to anyone’s will but his own, and he is free to pursue
his own interests with minimal hindrance. The “law of nature” is the right to protect
oneself and his extensions, which for Locke meant his property. As competition between
people inevitably brings rise to conflict, it was in the best interest of people to remain
solitary in the State of Nature. Where Locke departs from the Hobbesian theory most
sharply is in his focus on individual property. That man has no reasonable way to protect
his property within the State of Nature other than violence necessitates that a civil
society be formed in order to handle these disputes in a non-violent fashion. Society

3

Locke, John. Two Treatises on Government: a translation into modern English. Manchester: Industrial
Systems Research, 2009. 117.
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therefore represents an agreement between free agents to protect the liberties of the
individual, which contrasts significantly with the Hobbesian view.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau was interested in dealing with similar issues, and he
believed that the Hobbesian depiction of the savage man was inaccurate, or at least
incomplete. In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau examines human nature in its
most primitive form in an attempt to trace the roots of inequality among men. He strips
man down to his most basic form, “such as he must have issued from the hands of
Nature” and asserts that despite being less agile or physically powerful than other
animals, mankind is “the most advantageously organized of all.”4 Rousseau proposes
that the “savage man” (that is, someone living outside of society) is not ruled merely by
self-preservation, but also by an inherent sense of compassion that occurs between
sentient beings, which he calls pitié. The virtue of pity serves to lessen man’s natural
fervency for egocentrism and causes him to feel compassion for others despite his
tendency to act out of self-interest. This leads Rousseau to argue that the eventual
formation of societies (and subsequently, of governments) is in the interest of both pity
and self-preservation, as it would be difficult to imagine communities existing without
them. Contrary to Hobbes (and Locke, to a point), Rousseau does not envision an
inherently violent or anxious State of Nature. His is one of relative peace, and to him
societies are formed not to escape nature but to improve peoples’ lives and enable them
to accomplish more than they could have individually.

4

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and Donald A. Cress. Basic Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.
Print. 47.
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Aristotle takes a quite different different approach from the State of Nature
theorists in justifying the formation of the state in his Politics. Instead of merely being
conditioned by self-preservation, Aristotle conceptualizes that political associations are
formed because it is human nature to engage in politics. Aristotle begins by stating that
all human endeavors are aimed at “some good” and that therefore the formation of a
political association must also be aimed at “some good.” From this, he rationalizes that
the political institution aimed at the highest good, which also encompasses many
smaller goods, should be said to have the highest authority. This institution for him is the
Greek polis (and for us, the state), which is the natural culmination of its parts. In an
attempt to attain a higher quality of living, human beings have formed various
associations, beginning with the household, and then the village, and then ultimately the
state, or nation. Aristotle concludes that man is “by nature a political animal”5 insofar as
he is naturally inclined to form political units. If one were to live outside of the state, or
polis, he would be denying his nature and reducing himself to something less than an
animal, which is naturally at home in the wild. It is only as part of the polis that man can
achieve his highest ends.
Each of the above thinkers has a different understanding of what it means to be a
human being, and this leads each to a different conclusion about what a society ought
to look like. The Hobbesian perspective, which views man in a quite negative light,
lends itself to absolutism in an effort to control and constrain its citizens; to get them to
act not according to their nature but in a more manageable and civilized fashion. Life in
Hobbes’ State of Nature is a hellish chaos, and a strong controlling hand is necessary in

5

Aristotle, and C. D. C. Reeve. Politics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1998. Print. 1253a1-5.
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order to keep the peace. Locke’s understanding of human nature bears many
similarities to Hobbes’ but he has a quite different perspective on it. He views the
inherently dangerous conditions of the State of Nature as having a great deal of value in
the way they allow for individualism and freedom, but he still considers it to be unideal.
Aristotle’s view of nature, although he doesn’t address it as explicitly as Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, is also somewhat pessimistic. To him, human beings are essentially
insignificant when taken individually and their lives lack meaning or importance when
separated from their communities. The state is what teaches virtue and civility, and men
separated from their state are no better than animals, or worse—barbarians. This leads
Aristotle to suggest that any form of government is preferable to none at all, presumably
even if its citizens are miserable.
Rousseau’s conception of human nature is less negative: he sees mankind as
relatively well off prior to the creation of the state, and thus his state aims to mirror in
many ways the conditions of nature. Rousseau claims that in Nature man is subject only
to his instincts, guided by the inherent principles of self-preservation and pity. The
“savage man” has few needs in this state and no conception of good or evil. In response
to Hobbes’ assertion that a life in the State of Nature is miserable, Rousseau asks,
“What kind of misery can there be for a free being whose heart is at peace and whose
body is in good health?” After all, the burdens of the soul do not weigh on the savage
man as they do on the civil man. The civil man is more complex but also more
vulnerable, while the savage man must “think only of food, rest, and sex.”6 It is a
primitive state, but a happy one.

6

Rousseau. 60, 47.
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Section C: Compassion
Having discussed three different justifications for the existence of government, let
us try to explain the intended relationship between citizen and state. I have already
mentioned that a citizen’s political action is conditioned by two fundamental aspects of
his nature—compassion and pride—and that these two aspects of his nature must be
taken into account if a legitimate government is to function properly. Here I will discuss
the former.
Rousseau’s idea of self-preservation is relatively unusual. While he concurs with
most other thinkers of natural law in emphasizing every animal’s natural duty to
perpetuate its life, Rousseau couples this right with a deeply engrained desire to not
cause others pain. He calls this characteristic pity, or compassion, and explains that it
helps to counter man’s self-preservational instincts:
[Pity], having been given to man in order to mitigate, in certain
circumstances, the ferocity of his egocentrism, or the desire for selfpreservation before this egocentrism of his came into being,
tempers the ardor he has for his own well-being by an innate
repugnance to seeing his fellow men suffer.7
Self-preservation is among man’s strongest instincts and dictates nearly every one of
his actions, but only the most desperate circumstances can drive him to harm another
human being. Rousseau suggests the maxim: “Do what is good for you with as little
harm as possible to others.”8 In other words, one should not necessarily disregard the
well-being of his peers in the interest of self-preservation. This feeling of pity, or
compassion, is one of mankind’s most basic and pragmatic instincts.

7

Rousseau. 62.

8

Rousseau. 64.
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From as early as infancy, a baby will cry upon witnessing the displeasure of
another, signifying an inherent sense of compassion between people. This tendency
continues to develop over the course of a lifetime, becoming stronger and more
complex, and extending beyond one’s immediate peers. While an infant’s sense of
compassion may be limited to his caregivers and later to his family and friends, by late
adolescence most people have already developed a keen sense of empathy. This
empathy not only enables, but necessitates people to put themselves in the shoes of
another when considering how their actions will affect those around them. A century of
psychological research indicates that by the time young men and women reach
adulthood, they are capable of not just interpreting other’s emotional and physiological
states, but also intuitively predicting them. This sense allows people to experience,
viscerally or emotionally, the feelings or thoughts of another. The phenomenon being
described here is often referred to as “feeling for” someone else, and it is one that every
normally functioning and psychologically stable individual has experienced firsthand.9
This tendency, while emotionally charged, is not grounded in subjective emotion, but
rather in biological instinct. Humans must have compassion because without it the
species would be on a drastically different trajectory, one without complex civilization,
which would be impossible without an incredible propensity for cooperation. It is man’s
natural distaste for pain and his instinctual drive to protect his species that inclines him
toward pity. At this point, it may be beneficial to consider pity as an extension of man’s

Eisenberg, Nancy, and Janet Strayer. Empathy and Its Development. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987.
Print. 5-6.
9
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self-preservational instincts that servers to temper or direct it, as oppose to simply
countering it.
Due to man’s “repugnance” at witnessing the hardship of his peers, he is made to
act morally when interacting with others. Even when acting out of self-interest, the
savage man rarely seeks to take advantage of others because he has nothing to gain
by doing so with no conception of property or value beyond survival in the State of
Nature. Instead, he chooses to help others, often at his own expense. An act of pity can
even serve to undermine one’s self-preservation. For example, while saving someone’s
life is an act of compassion, it also perpetuates the competition for important resources
like food. Nonetheless, pity constantly drives man to act with apparent disregard for selfinterest. Rousseau writes:
Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see
suffering. Pity is what, in the state of nature, takes the place of
laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted
to disobey its sweet voice.10

This understanding of common interest or support serves the same purpose as a set of
laws or virtues because it protects each individual and any of his or her extensions, i.e.,
one’s property and loved ones. If one feels pity and sympathy for another, he is less
inclined to harm him. Compassion discourages violence and encourages co-existence
and natural equality, as laws attempt to do. Rousseau’s take on “natural law” differs
significantly from Locke’s, which entails merely the right to protect oneself and results in
conflict, not peace. The “advantage” that Rousseau mentions is that since these natural

10

Rousseau. 64.
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laws exist inherently in mankind, there is no controlling authority or coercing party to
oppose. It would seem, then, that a state in which man is most free to act in accordance
with his nature is both happier and contains less social unrest. If the laws were merely a
reflection of man’s own natural tendencies, where would he be tempted to disobey?

Section E: Pride
Having addressed compassion, it is important to discuss the other essential
aspect of human nature—pride—and where it originates. In order to survive, the savage
man needed to learn to protect himself and hunt. Rousseau writes, “his superiority over
the other animals ...produced within him the first stirrings of pride; ...he laid claim to it in
virtue of his individuality.”11 Man began to consider himself dominant among species,
which led to the development of pride. Although the savage man had previously
preferred to remain solitary, he started comparing himself to others and finding that they
had much in common. This enabled him to either work with others or continue to live
alone; all this without the development of a spoken language. When man discovered
certain tasks were more plausible with the help of others, his inclination switched to
community-based living, since he no longer would need to preform every task himself.
Societies grew in size, starting with small families and ending eventually in entire
nations.

11

Rousseau. 70.
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The pride that developed from man’s self-awareness is not just an individual
pride, or pride in oneself, but also a pride that extends beyond the self to include ones
peers. Mankind’s dominance over other species serves to unite it, and it seems at times
that anything can be accomplished with cooperation. While nearly every species
cooperates, some even more than humans, what these other species lack is intellect
and morality, which are unique to humans. It is with these unique elements of humanity
that one learns to feel pride for the right things and experience it at the proper moments.
While pride is often negatively construed as egocentrism, there are several positive
forms of pride that an individual can experience. Pride in ones community, for example,
is a quite positive feeling to have, as is pride in ones work. Unlike individual pride, these
other forms of pride are not grounded in an inflated self image, but rather in the
knowledge that one has worked to create something good, like how athletes feel pride
in the success of their team. With a sufficient intellect and a proper ethical background,
one can appreciate the value of experiencing pride in certain instances.
Aristotle believed that a proper moral education was crucial to the flourishing of a
society. Since the state is defined by its citizens, a good state must be made up of good
citizens, and a good state would also produce good citizens. Part of being a virtuous
citizen is learning how to properly experience certain feelings, like pleasure and pain, or
joy and sadness. One of the concepts that is fundamental to Aristotle’s ethics is that of
the “Golden Mean”, which implies maintaining a balance between two extremes of ones
character, one being excess and the other being deficiency.12 It is in the balance of

Aristotle, and Richard McKeon. The Basic Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 2009. Print.
1106a26-b28.
12
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these extremes that true virtue belongs. For example, courage is the Mean between
recklessness and cowardice. Someone who is courageous is able to assess certain
dangers and recognize that some are worth facing and others are not, and the amount
of fear he experiences is appropriate to the situation. A coward would be overcome by
fear, and a reckless person would have no fear at all. Aristotle suggests that the same
scheme applies to each of the virtues. Virtue, then, is an intermediate condition that
must be experienced in moderation.
Pride is considered a virtue by Aristotle, and it exists in the mean between vanity
and timidness. He describes it thus: “Now the man is thought to be proud who thinks
himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them; for he who does so beyond his
deserts is a fool”.13 One who considers himself to be worthy of greatness, or capable of
great things, but is in fact neither, is vain.The vain person is delusional and has an
inflated self image; his opinion of himself is not reflected in his actions and he wrongly
attributes certain virtues to himself. On the other hand, one who considers himself to be
unworthy of greatness, or fails to recognize his greatness is timid, or “unduly humble”.
The timid person is also unable to perceive himself accurately, though in a way opposite
to the vain person. One who is proud, though, is both worthy of great things and knows
himself to be so. He is able to see himself for what he is, and to meaningfully judge his
own worth. One who is proud should also be recognized by his peers for being great,
since his opinion of himself must correspond with others’ opinions of him, because
greatness is not a subjective condition to Aristotle.

13

Aristotle, McKeon. 1125a15-20.
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In addition to feeling pride in the proper ways, one must also feel pride at the
proper moments, and for the proper things. The proud person does not feel pride in
regards to “small matters”, but rather his focus is on greater things. The greatest
endeavor from the Aristotelian perspective is the political life, or the engagement of a
citizen with his state. In his Nicomachean Ethics he describes politics as “the most
authoritative” and “the master art”.14 The highest end that one can pursue is a life of
politics, which is a life dedicated to the betterment of one’s community. Since it is human
nature to form political communities, then one’s humanity is inherently tied to the state,
and it is his responsibility to improve it.
Aristotle’s 5th century Athens was governed by direct democracy, a system in
which every citizen has equal say in all the decision-making of the polis. Citizens were
invited each week to attend the public assembly where they would vote, by show of
hands, on policies proposed by their fellow Athenians. These meetings generally took
place in the agora, or the central marketplace of the city, which was the heart of the
city’s public life. While those most eloquent and persuasive were often admired as
leaders within the assembly, there was no official transference of authority to others in
the form of delegates or electors. This direct democracy differs considerably from
American representative government in that a sense of personal responsibility for the
success (or failure) of the polis was deeply embedded within its citizens.
As adolescents, all Greeks were required to undergo military training and serve
in their city-state’s army. In Athens, these young men were called ephebos, and they

14
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were instructed in fighting, physical fitness, and academics (referred to as ephebic
training) before fulfilling two years of mandatory military service at the age of eighteen.
Similar to a school class or team, the ephebes would enjoy a wide range of activities
aimed at fraternization and camaraderie, such as playing sports or putting on organized
performances for the viewing pleasure of the polis. Once they had graduated from their
ephebic status and become men in the eyes of the state, each was officially granted
citizenship. Every citizen was expected (but not legally obligated) to take part in the
political life of the city by serving terms in public office and attending judicial or
deliberative assemblies, where individuals were free to express their own beliefs and
opinions. Citizens lived together, fought together, enjoyed leisure together, and
governed together. As a result, they shared a unique and proud bond.
So strong was this bond that to be exiled from the polis was considered a fate far
worse than death. One could be banished from the city for life, or one could be exiled
for a period of ten years, which was called ostracism. Once a year the assembly would
meet in the agora to discuss potential ostracisms; each citizen would write the names of
those they wanted to be exiled and place them into an urn to be counted. If, according
to Plutarch, one name received at least six-thousand votes, that citizen would have his
case debated two months later. A maximum of one citizen could be exiled each year.
Ostracism was used employed most often as a preemptive measure against a
perceived tyrant or some other treat to the Athenian democracy. While the great and
controversial political leader Pericles was not ostracized himself, he was at multiple
times a candidate. One of his prominent rivals, Thucydides (not the historian), was
ostracized and removed from Athens when his beliefs were deemed to be subversive.
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In the 6th century B.C., Peisistratos was permanently banished for attempting to claim
power in Athens. While in exile, he amassed an army of mercenaries and returned to
the city to take it by force. One could also be forced into exile without a formal trial, such
as in the case of the tyrant Alcibiades, who first fled to Sparta and then to Persia, after
being involved in a brutal takeover of Athens, during which the city-state became an
oligarchy instead of a democracy.
In the words of the orator Antiphon, to be exiled was to become “a beggar in a
strange land, an old man without a city.”15 One’s life was so intertwined with his peers
and with the city that to be forced out of it would have been unthinkable to most.
Aristotle argued that since the polis and the individual citizen each ultimately desired
happiness, their aims were inseparable. As a result, the concept of opposition between
the laws of the state and the rights or freedoms of its citizens did not exist in ancient
Athens. They were considered to be one and the same. This would lead Aristotle to
posit, famously, that man is “by nature a political animal”, in that man’s sense of
personhood was deeply reliant on political association. He went as far as to assert that
man fails to fulfill his ultimate purpose when disconnected from the polis; he is not
“human” in the truest sense of the word. Aristotle, in his extreme communitarianism,
argued that life has no value outside the boundaries of the state. His predecessor,
Socrates, refused to leave Athens even through periods of intense violence and political
scrutiny, despite many accounts indicating that he would have been welcomed by nearly
any city. Instead he was reserved to die, rather than flee from his city.

15

Allen, Danielle S. The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton UP, 2000. Print. 204.
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The pride that the Athenians felt for their community is unmatched, and it
represents the ideal relationship between citizen and state. This sense of pride is
absolutely essential to the proper functioning of any political community, and it grows
from the involvement of each individual. If someone feels a deep connection with
something, he is likely to do his best to sustain and improve it, especially if it is
something he himself created. In an ideal and legitimate state, every citizen has a hand
in its functioning and its progression. In this way, the political trajectory of the state
aligns with the spirit of its citizens, and constantly evolves along with their views. People
are always evolving, and it should always be the goal of a legitimate state to evolve with
them.

Section E: Pride, Compassion, Gardens
If pride is the force that motivates political action, then compassion is what
directs it. Empathy exists inherently between people, but this empathy rarely applies
beyond ones immediate relationships. A small child may care for his parents or his
siblings, but he is not yet able to extend this same sense of empathy to those not
closest to him. By adolescence he most likely cares about many more people than he
did as a child, such that he is beginning to be able to imagine himself in another’s
shoes, but still his perspective and compassion are limited to his own private world. It is
only in adulthood that one’s sphere of empathy can plausibly extend so far as to include
the interests of people across the country, or half way around the world, and even then
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it is still an imperfect compassion. Compassion, like pride, is a virtue that must be
cultivated if it is to properly condition political action.
A properly developed sense of compassion is rooted in the understanding that
people are interconnected and the desire to not cause harm to others. The truly
compassionate political actor does not seek to take advantage of others for personal
gain, but rather he sees their interests as the same. His sense of pride is tightly
interwoven with his sense of compassion, as the latter forces the former outward,
despite its tendency to face inward. It is what causes him to feel pride in the success of
the state, because each of his peers is seen as an extension of himself and his own
identity. The compassionately prideful man is one doesn’t judge his worth by
comparison to his fellow citizens, but by the effects his actions have on his fellow
citizens. Compassion, when applied to the political sphere, is what guides people
toward right action and allows for a sense of national pride that is grounded in the
success of the state, and never in xenophobia.
The conceptual moment when mankind leaves the state of nature in favor of
society is crucial in understanding the legitimacy of government. Hobbes, Rousseau,
and other social contract theorists share in common the belief that people enter into
society with the goal in mind to protect themselves and live better. After all, no one
would consent to something that somehow reduced their standard of living. Where
these theorists differ is in their view of human nature and the degree to which the state
is obligated to constrain it. Hobbes’ state of nature is brutal, anxious, and unsafe. He
describes it as bellum omnium contra omnes, or “the war of all against all”, in his
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Leviathan. His view of the savage man is the most primitive of the state of nature
theorists, and he saw men as naturally and violently opposed to one another in their
fierce competition for resources and survival. Because of this negative view of human
nature, he asserted that the best government (an absolute monarch in his case) must
be one that counters man’s innate tendencies and forces him into submission. Hobbes
is not concerned as much with bringing people together, as he believes that it is not in
their nature to coexist: “men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of
griefe) in keeping company.”16 Thus his envisioned state is one in which people are held
or forced together. It is not one built upon human nature, but one built in opposition to it.
The state of nature is a despicable state; one that must be escaped by any means
necessary.
What separates Rousseau’s social and political theory from Hobbes’ is that the
former views humans in a more positive light. To Rousseau, the state of nature is not
something to be feared, but rather something to be revered. The savage man is much
more psychologically complex than Hobbes would have us believe. The savage man is
concerned with extending his life, but not necessarily at the expense of others. He is
completely content, or even happy, in his limited existence because he has everything
he needs to survive and no knowledge of anything more. Even more significant is the
fact that the savage man has complete freedom, which is something that has not
existed since the advent of society. Whereas Hobbes is fearful of this freedom, because
he thinks men would use this freedom to harm one another, Rousseau embraces it
because he believes they will choose to coexist in relative peace. This view leads
16
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Rousseau to advocate a form of government not aimed at constraining its citizens, but
instead at providing them with as many “natural” rights as possible and encouraging
cooperation. Any laws preventing citizens from doing harm to one another could be
justified on the basis that they protect and encourage human nature.
Additionally, they hold different views regarding the natural and legal rights of
people, some appearing unalienable and other appearing quite alienable. It is clear that
man must give up certain freedoms in order to enjoy a higher standard of living, but the
key is finding which freedoms he is capable of giving up while still feeling free. This
feeling of freedom is absolutely crucial to an optimally functioning society. In order to
experience a well-founded pride in ones state, he must feel a sense of connection to it
that can only be built by means of political engagement. Just as an artist experiences
pride in creating a work of art, or a worker in a job well done, so too does a citizen’s
pride in his state follow from his personal stake in it. It is his feeling of freedom, though,
that enables him to interact genuinely and without constraint with his state. If the state
were to impose itself on its citizens in a way that made them feel imposed on, they
would begin feeling resentment toward it, not pride. Ones feeling of nationalism and
political pride must be rooted in the belief that he affected it and that he chose freely to
feel this way.
In his book Utopia, Thomas More aims to create a perfect “utopian” society
based on his own ideology. Among some of the strange and unique religious, economic,
and political customs he describes, More emphasizes the intense connection his
Utopians have with one another and with the state. His is a society without personal
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property, so each family takes turns living in different houses, all of which are built
almost identically with a large garden space out front. More is fascinated with the way in
which the Utopians interact with these temporary, communal spaces. He pays particular
attention to the gardens of these houses, which the Utopians maintain with the utmost
care:
They cultivate their gardens with great care, so that they have both
vines, fruits, herbs, and flowers in them; and all is so well ordered,
and so finely kept, that I never saw gardens anywhere that were
both so fruitful and so beautiful as theirs. And this humour of
ordering their gardens so well, is not only kept up by the pleasure
they find in it, but also by an emulation between the inhabitants of
the several streets, who vie with each other; and there is indeed
nothing belonging to the whole town that is both more useful and
more pleasant.17
More’s preoccupation with these gardens in both strange and striking upon first
encounter with the text, but it is apparent that they represent something far more
significant to him than the outdoor recreation they entail and the beautification they
provide. The Utopian garden is a symbol of the state as a whole, and the care that
citizens put into maintaining their gardens is reflective of their relationship with their
state. Though it is not spelled out neatly for the reader, More characterizes his Utopians’
sense of citizenship through not just their civic engagement, but also their seemingly
insignificant interests and pastimes.
Although several aspects of More’s Utopian society are too foreign to seriously
entertain, his discussion of gardens represents well the ideal connection between
citizen and state. The garden is the medium through which Utopians can express their
More, Thomas, George M. Logan, and Robert M. Adams. Thomas More: Utopia. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2002. Print. 31-32.
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love for their community. These gardens are not theirs to keep, but still they feel intense
satisfaction in working to make it better. Each group of Utopians that rotates through
any given house contributes to the flourishing of that house’s garden, making it more
fruitful and beautiful for the family that moves in next. In a short period of time the entire
city is filled with lush gardens, which everyone agrees is both pleasant and practical.
What is most remarkable about this practice is that these Utopians are driven not by
selfishness or ego, but by a desire to contribute to something greater than what any one
individual can achieve. They are not forced by the state to maintain their gardens but
rather chose to do so freely. Outside of his viewing pleasure, the individual does not
clearly gain anything for himself by gardening. But his actions, and the simultaneous
actions of his peers, are what make Utopia such a nice place to live. It is a society
comprised of people who believe in making it as good as it can be and feel pride in
doing so.
In an ideal state, each person should strive to make his state better and this is
done through political action. Imagine that the political sphere is one large Utopian
garden with every citizen engaged in making it flourish. This engagement is not just
essential in making the state as good as it can possibly be, but it also cultivates a sense
of pride for the state that can only grow from having a personal stake in it. This personal
stake is the basis for a healthy national pride, which derives not from fear or dislike of
others but from communal accomplishment. Once this pride is built, it will continue to
encourage political action.
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Part Two
Section A: The State as a Fluid Amalgamation of Wills
Since the state has no legitimacy beyond that which it is given by its citizens,
who consent (whether explicitly or implicitly) to live within it instead of within the state of
nature, it must find harmony between both their intrinsic nature and their desires. It must
be not an absolute authority but rather a true consensus of its people. A direct
democracy is best because it is capable of most truly reflecting the will of its citizens
through their direct contribution and because it empowers each man to, more or less, be
the master of his own fate. In fact, I would posit that any other form of government is
illegitimate in that each fails to adequately embody the spirit of its people and to foster
compassion and pride within them.
As has been stated previously, ones will cannot be delegated, and the only
adequate representation is self-representation. A government that fails to engage its
citizens cannot be considered legitimate, since it was formed on the basis of their
political cooperation, and no person would willingly relinquish their authority or consent
to be governed by their peer. The Hobbesian monarchy alienates the individual from the
state, and ultimately from his peers. It also counters mankind’s natural tendencies,
fostering resentment and eventually building dissent, which leads to social unrest and
violence. Rousseau’s government brings people together. And since it is built upon our
natural values and inclinations, there is much less resentment. Widespread public
involvement is important in fostering a sense of freedom, interconnection, and national
pride. These things are inherently lacking in authoritarian governments.
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Government is nothing more than an amalgamation of its peoples’ wills, and it is
through them that it originates. A government should at no point have a will, identity, or
purpose of its own. These are continuously created for it by its citizens through political
engagement. The sole purpose of government should be to facilitate the political activity
of its citizens and it should have no inherent responsibility beyond this. The only
legitimate form of government must therefore be the one that most directly embodies
the wills and natures of its citizens. In any legitimate state, there is little or no distinction
between the citizens and the state, and the state is perceived merely as an extension of
its people, evolving constantly with them and at no point constraining or controlling
them.

Section B - Tyranny of the Majority
A rational criticism of direct democracy, and indeed any form of democracy,
would be that it allows for ‘tyranny of the majority’, a term coined by John Adams in the
late 18th century. This is a condition in which the majority population places its own
interests above those of the various minority populations within a state. The interest of
the majority can often be at the expense of the minority, causing the latter to feel
imposed on. The oppression experienced by the minority is comparable to that
experienced under a tyrant or autocrat. Indeed it is the nature of democracies to form a
consensus, or general will, that sees some suffer while most flourish.
This phenomena is represented by the famous trial of Socrates in 399 B.C.,
which brought an end to one of the most intellectually enlightened eras in history. The
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event continues to baffle philosophers and historians today. Why, in a society praised for
its freedom and intellectuality, would a jury of five hundred Athenians sentence to death
a man who has been described as the ‘wisest man in Greece’ just years before he
would have met his natural end?18 The fact that Socrates taught in Athens for his entire
adult life with minimal hinderance serves to further complicate this question. What could
he have said or done to warrant the steep charges laid against him? While it is
impossible to truly determine the rationale behind such a verdict, an analysis of the
relevant sources indicates that Socrates was perceived as a threat to the Athenian
democracy and the traditional institutions of the city.
Despite his fame and the unparalleled influence he has had on the development
of philosophy, little is actually known of the character of Socrates. Since he never wrote
down his ideas or kept written records, all information regarding the man himself can be
found in various subjective accounts by his contemporaries. Born in 470 B.C., as a
young man Socrates witnessed the rise to power of Pericles and the dawn of a new era
of prosperity and freedom that followed. Pericles (who may well have been the first
liberal politician in Western history) believed that everyone deserved liberty, not just
wealthy property owners. His allocation of Athenian resources to the arts, courts, and
public welfare initiatives resulted in a significant power shift from the once all-powerful
aristocrats to the masses.
Yet despite having come of age in the bastion of democracy and liberalism that
was fifth-century Athens, Socrates developed a curious set of ideals that would separate
18
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him from most of his fellow Athenians and ultimately serve as the basis for some of the
charges against him. Socrates was neither a democrat nor did he believe in a sense of
inherent equality among men. In fact, he posited that the masses were not fit for selfgovernance, but rather they should be guided by those most wise and suited for
leadership. Furthermore, he asserted that the common man was not capable of
cultivating the virtue and intellect necessary for a state to flourish, and he even
protested the right of such citizens to participate in politics and speak in public
assemblies. Socrates’ unpopular opinions quickly became known, as the majority of his
discussions would take place in the streets of Athens. In Plato’s Gorgias, Socrates
criticizes Pericles for causing Athenians to become “idle, cowardly, talkative and
avaricious.”19 According to the third century biographer Diogenes Laertius, who wrote a
series of brief histories on many prominent figures, Socrates developed a reputation as
an eccentric instigator who often voiced his beliefs with condescension and contempt,
making his listeners angry and even provoking some to violence. Laertius writes of
Socrates, “frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, men set upon him with their
fists or tore his hair out; and for the most part he was despised and laughed at, yet bore
all this ill-usage patiently.”20 However controversial his teachings may have been,
Socrates was probably not perceived as much of a threat to Athens until later in his life.
Or perhaps he was simply testing the tolerance of his peers, until they reached breaking
point at the time of the trial. Nevertheless, he was allowed to continue his philosophizing
throughout his entire adult life without significant interference.
19
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Socrates’ reputation suffered significantly around the turn of the fourth century
when the democracy was temporarily overthrown twice by two of Socrates’ closest
friends and pupils; Alcibiades in 411 B.C. and Critias about six years later. The
teachings of Socrates began to be seen as subversive, as the two violent revolutions
led by the pro-aristocratic Alcibiades and Critias reflected his distaste for the current
Athenian government and his oligarchic leanings. Socrates was even said to have
admired Sparta (the primary rival of Athens) for its oligarchy, which is expressed in
Aristophanes’ Birds, when he is described as the idol of the pro-Spartan dissenters in
Athens.21 During these two brief periods of oligarchy, Athens witnessed incredible
violence and many of the prominent members of the democracy were either killed or
exiled from Athens, including Anytus, who would later be one of the leading prosecutors
of Socrates. Critias belonged to a notorious group of oligarchs called the Thirty Tyrants,
who would wreak further destruction and injustice upon the people of Athens, and who
propounded many of the same ideals as Socrates. While it is unclear as to what
Socrates’ relationship was with the Thirty Tyrants, he said and did nothing to stop their
injustice, and this would be mentioned during his trial. At this time, the Athenians began
to perceive Socrates in a new light: his teachings were no longer harmless and he was
no longer just a local eccentric with questionable values. From this point on, he was
viewed as a dangerous influence that bred tyrants and threatened the common people.
Following the reestablishment of the democracy in 403 B.C., an official pardon
prevented Socrates and a great many others from being prosecuted for any of their
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actions during or before the reign of the Thirty Tyrants. In other words, Socrates would
have to be charged with criminal activity between the years 403 and 399 B.C., however,
he would continue his teachings unfalteringly during these years despite pressure to
cease. He once again found himself at the center of another anti-democratic revolt in
401, this one also led by the disgruntled aristocratic youth, who were well-known to
have flocked to Socrates. The people of Athens had had enough of Socrates and his
influence over their youth. His close relationship with the traitor Alcibiades and the
barbarous Critias was suspicious to say the least and his knack for attracting young,
powerful Athenian aristocrats would have been enough to warrant his execution in
association with the injustice of the Thirty Tyrants. Despite the general amnesty that was
issued following the reinstatement of the democracy, Socrates continued to voice his
anti-egalitarian, pro-oligarchic beliefs with a fervor that was credited for turning
otherwise peaceful young men into violent Spartan-emulating tyrants.
A famous interpretation of the trial is presented by Aechines about fifty years
later, indicating that the true cause of Socrates’ execution was his association with the
Thirty Tyrants. To a jury of Athenians he spoke, “you executed Socrates, the sophist,
because he was clearly responsible for the education of Critias, one of the thirty antidemocratic leaders.”22 This allusion to Socrates by the orator Aechines is incredibly
significant and indicative of the underlying issue of the trial. Aechines wouldn’t have
made this reference if the reason for the philosopher’s execution was not generally
accepted to have been his connection to the Tyrants, and the fact that Aechines won his
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case further demonstrates the potency of this reference. The injustice and brutality of
the Thirty Tyrants was still fresh in the memory of Athenians and so too was the blemish
on Socrates’ reputation that resulted from his indisputable influence on Critias, the most
powerful of the oligarchs. While it is impossible to prove that Socrates was directly
responsible for the injustices committed against the democracy, an analysis of the
available information warrants, at least, guilt by association. The incredible irony of the
trial is that Athens, a city-state in which its citizens enjoyed unparalleled cultural and
intellectual liberty, sentenced to death their greatest thinker in what is perhaps one of
the most significant and obvious abridgments of a citizen’s freedom of speech in
Western history. In Plato’s Apology, Socrates calls himself a “gadfly”, responsible for
keeping the horse that is the Athenian state from getting lazy by always asking
questions and seeking justice, but according to journalist I.F. Stone, “it seems his sting
was not much in evidence when Athens needed it most.”23 Perhaps the real guilt of the
wisest man in Greece was his inaction in the face of clear injustice.

Section C - The State as a Moral Teacher
Among the most significant political philosophers to disapprove of the state’s
involvement in the lives of its citizens is John Stuart Mill. In his book On Liberty, Mill
applies his utilitarian ethics to the state and to society as a whole. He has his own ideal
for the relationship between the individual and authority—one in which the state has no
right to take away the liberty of its citizens in any way. There are several ways that a
23
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state can threaten the liberties of its people. One way is to directly impose its will on
them in such a way that the individual feels as though he cannot make his own
decisions, or that he is constrained in his action. This way is quite straightforward, but
Mill believes that a government also threatens its people’s freedom when it uses
coercion or attempts to influence them against their will. This includes manipulating
public opinion or indirectly inserting certain beliefs into the minds of the masses. In Mill’s
most legitimate and ideal state, each individual is free to pursue his own interests and
do his best to improve his own life. The only restriction on this freedom is that ones
actions cannot cause harm to others.
In chapter one, Mill famously posits, “That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent one from doing harm to others.”24 This assertion forms the basis of Mill’s ‘Harm
Principle’, which remains the cornerstone of libertarian theory. According to the Harm
Principle, any action which threatens the integrity of another individual’s complete
sovereignty is unjustified, even if the best interests of said individual are at the heart of
the action:
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because,
in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The
only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to
society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely
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concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.25

The only instances where such actions can be justified are when the the wellbeing of an
individual is at stake. For example, the state is justified in making laws that keep its
citizens from killing one another, or perhaps even in punishing those who break such
laws. That any harmful action between men is unacceptable follows from mankind’s
most basic instinct: self-preservation. Mill’s understanding of self-preservation is quite
similar to Rousseau’s, and both men agree that it is an innate and inescapable aspect
of human nature. Every person has the right to protect themselves, and it is man’s most
natural liberty.
It would seem that a state aimed at moral education is at odds with the libertarian
belief that government ought not to interfere in the lives of its citizens. Indeed, it has
already been established that governments derive their legitimacy only from the people,
and that the only legitimate governments act solely in accordance with the wills of its
people. In a just and proper state, the individual is the master of his own fate; he is free
to make decisions for himself regarding how he wants to live and how he spends his
time. There are many today who resent any action taken by the government that
disturbs their lives at all, even if it is for the benefit of the whole. It is essential that
government not purposely act against the desires of its people or cause harm to them in
any way. An ideal state reflects the nature of its citizens, and among man’s most natural
tendencies are pride and compassion. An ideal state is therefore not only proud and
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compassionate in and of itself, but it aims to further cultivate these virtues within its
citizens. It is in this way that a government can, and must, work to instill and perfect the
virtues of pride and compassion without the possibility of conflicting with the wills of its
people. The only time it is permissible for the state to involve itself in the personal lives
of its citizens is to promote these most fundamental human values, which in turn
encourage political activity and improve the state and the lives of its individuals.
Mill’s understanding of man’s most primitive nature, that is, his inherent drive to
preserve his own life, fails to take both pride and compassion into account. Pride grows
from the drive for self-preservation. It is what makes people work constantly to improve
their lives and achieve more, even once they are safe from harm. Compassion is the
cause for man’s natural aversion to harming others, despite his desire to improve his
own lot at any cost. These two aspects of human nature are just as deeply embedded
as liberty and self-preservation in the nature of mankind and ought therefore to play just
as fundamental a role in a legitimate government.
It is absolutely crucial that a legitimate government foster pride and compassion
within its people because without these it is impossible to achieve an ideal democracy.
The most ideal democracy is one in which the greatest number of citizens is actively
involved in the affairs of the state. The two forces of pride and compassion inspire and
condition political action, which is necessary if a state is to accurately and continuously
reflect the wills of its citizens. Each citizen ought to feel connected to the state as if it
were something he himself worked tirelessly to create. He ought to feel pride in his state
for this reason, just like an artist feels pride in his artwork or a doctor feels pride in
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helping someone. This is not a selfish pride, but rather an appreciation of a job well
done. In fact, pride in ones state can be characterized as the least selfish action
achievable, since it inspires action in the service of something greater than any
individual. Political action is most often aimed at the benefit of the community, and one
rarely takes such action for the sake of himself.
Compassion is what tempers his intrinsic drive to please only himself, and
motivates him to desire the welfare of others. American politics are dominated by a
perpetual power struggle between two opposing parties, each seeking to undermine the
other in an attempt to appease their advocates and increase their credibility. Too often
the success of one party is at the expense of the other, and it seems that each decision
made in favor of one is taking something from the other. Indeed, the success of one
party is often described in terms of its curtailing of the other’s agenda; one cannot thrive
while the other does not suffer. A dominant percentage of Americans align themselves
with one political party and will never stray from it. Polls over the last several
presidencies have shown that the majority of citizens will vote for their party’s candidate
regardless of who that candidate is or what they represent, and without considering the
other party’s candidate whatsoever. The problem is, of course, a fundamental one
rooted deeply in party politics, but one can imagine that in a world where one’s interests
extend beyond his own personal wellbeing to include the wellbeing of neighbors and
distant countrymen alike, one might be more likely to make political decisions based on
something more than party allegiance. With the proper manifestations of pride and
compassion, one should feel personal fulfillment in the flourishing of his state. In this
way, the interests of the state and the interests of the individual are aligned.
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In response to Mill’s assertion that a government has no right to threaten the
sovereignty of the individual, or to interfere in the lives of its people, I posit that pride
and compassion are fundamental to achieving true sovereignty. Pride and compassion
are necessary for political action, which is the means by which one affirms his
sovereignty and protects his liberty. In this sense, the cultivation of pride and
compassion by the state is principally responsible for both sovereignty and liberty, and
any state that does not work to instill these values in its citizens is keeping them from
achieving the highest, most valuable form of free political action.

Section D: Nationalism and Compassionate Politics
Though the proper cultivation of pride and compassion within a citizen should
result in a strong sense of nationalism, it is important to distinguish this well-founded
attachment to ones state from the harmful manifestation of national pride that results in
bigotry and xenophobia. Nationalist sentiment is most often built upon feelings of pride
that one develops for his own people. This pride, though, frequently involves more than
just love for ones country. History has shown that nationalist sentiment often
corresponds directly with xenophobia, or hatred of foreigners. In other words, the more
someone loves their country, the less they like people of different nationalities. It has
also been shown that levels of nationalism and xenophobia both decrease with
increases in education.26 That is to say, the more educated people are, the less likely
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they are to express nationalist sentiment and the less likely they are to express feelings
of xenophobia. This leads to the somewhat unfair conclusion that intelligent people are,
in general, less bigoted and less attached to their state than unintelligent people, who
are more hateful and ignorantly nationalistic. Both xenophobia and nationalism, though,
should be considered entirely separate from intelligence. The former is the result of a
misled sense of pride and a lack of true compassion, and the latter is the result of a
properly developed sense of pride that is conditioned by compassion.
The two sides of nationalism, the constructive and the destructive, can be seen
even in short periods of history. The birth of German nationalism in the 19th century
demonstrates well the power of national pride paired with compassion. At a time when
Germany was merely a collection of independent states, enlightenment philosopher
Johann Gottfried Herder created a concept of German nationalism based on collective
self determination and cultural identity. His concept echoed many of the naturalistic
sentiments of Rousseau, and asserted that the German nation derives its legitimacy
from the shared language and culture of its people. In his Addresses to the German
Nation, Johann Gottlieb Fichte posited:
Just as it is true beyond doubt that, wherever a separate language
is found, there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take
independent charge of its affairs and to govern itself.27
The German people shared an identity and they were drawn to one another naturally.
This nationalist movement would endure the Napoleonic Wars before eventually
achieving tentative unification in 1848 and forming a national spirit based on equal
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representation, popular sovereignty, and most importantly, inclusion. In this instance, as
well as in the example of 5th century Athens, the positive force of a healthy sense of
nationalism is evident.
The negative manifestation of nationalism—one lacking in compassion—can be
seen in Germany just a few short years later. The emergence of the German Empire in
1871 marked a fundamental shift in the way national identity was conceived of. What
was once a government based on liberal, egalitarian values quickly became
authoritarian in nature, as the goal of the newly formed nation changed from unification
to asserting political, military, and cultural dominance on its citizens and its neighbors.
German nationalism no longer served to inspire pride and compassion within its people,
but instead indoctrinated its people with racism and social Darwinism. These sentiments
would remain pervasive in Germany politics throughout the First and Second World
Wars, during which Germany would be motivated by naked aggression and unchecked
pride to commit heinous crimes against their enemies.
Though every human has the innate capacity for compassion, the type of
compassion necessary to counter the potential destructiveness of national pride is not
easy to cultivate. As is discussed earlier, it takes a degree of maturity and habituation in
order for ones compassion to truly extend beyond his own countrymen, let alone his
own peers. Compassion is rooted in a shared identity, and it can be quite difficult for
someone to feel a shared identity with someone from a different culture. But even
people of different culture, color, or language are united in the most important and
fundamental way: they are all member of the human race and can therefore empathize
with one another profoundly. Though not every human being is able to recognize this
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shared global identity, it is much stronger than it may seem. During wartime, it is
common practice to develop racist or dehumanizing attitudes toward ones enemies as a
way of justifying or necessitating violence towards them. Reducing ones enemies to a
subhuman level makes it easier for one to fight his compassionate nature, since it
severs their shared identity and makes it more difficult to empathize. But to do harm to
another human being is a betrayal of man’s most intrinsic nature. It is the capacity for
universal compassion that keeps pride in ones state from becoming a motivator for
violence. The ideal citizen has pride in the flourishing of his state in addition to a keen
sense of compassion for his fellow human beings.
This is Rousseau’s concept of pity expanded beyond the individual to include the
affairs of the state. His maxim for life within the State of Nature, “do what is good for you
with as little harm as possible to others”, can be understood in a much broader sense
than Rousseau entails. If violence between people in the State of Nature is
discouraged, if not avoided entirely, by their innate repulsion to causing harm to one
another, then why can’t this same drive also characterize international politics? Global
interactions are largely governed by the same laws as the State of Nature, in the sense
that there are no laws, nor a central government, to keep the peace. Order is
maintained between nations by necessity. Although there have been times when this
order has been lost, it is found again when man’s natural compassion is allowed to take
over. Compassion is what keeps international disputes from turning violent, and what
encourages nations to work together to solve world problems instead of constantly
waging war against one another. Just as in the State of Nature, the international players
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always seek to protect themselves and improve their own positions, but rarely does this
drive take the form of physical violence.
An ideal state is one governed by the principles of pride and compassion, which
are the two drives most fundamental to human nature. It is comprised of citizens that
feel a deep sense of pride in the flourishing of their state and for the role they play in its
operation. But despite their desire to improve it as much as they are able, they will
always stop short of causing harm to other states. They will also respect the pride
others feel for their states because they understand the connection that exists between
citizen and state if the latter is legitimate.

Part Three

Section A: Citizen/State as Parent/Child
The relationship that one has with his state both guides his political action and
grows from it. That one feels a connection to his countrymen and for his state should
not be taken for granted, though. For example, a citizen of one state might find it easier
to identify with the policies of another state if his appears to not reflect his values or
beliefs. This is the fault of both the individual and his state. Just as a citizen has the
responsibility to actively participate in the operation of his state through engaging in
political action, the state has an obligation to foster the relationship between itself and
its citizens. In an ideal state, a citizen will neither shy away from political action nor
divorce himself from his national identity should his government make a decision he
cannot support. Instead, his resolve in strengthened and his desire to engage in political
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life is renewed. Just as each citizen is a child of the state, so too is the state a creation
of its citizens—an amalgamation of their wills.
The necessary relationship between citizen and state is similar to the relationship
between parent and child. A child is a reflection of his parents in some way, just as the
state is a reflection of its citizens. But every parent wants his child to be somehow better
than him, so he tries to pass down only his most positive and desirable traits. This is the
same for a state, which models itself after a set of ideals that transcend the individual
citizen. Although human beings are imperfect in nature, they must believe that through
combined effort they can create a state that encompasses all of their best features, and
as few of their negative ones as possible. Most importantly, a parent never gives up on
his child. No matter what the child has done, a parent is never free of his parental
responsibility. To abandon ones state just because it is not, at that moment, reflective of
ones interests is to abandon his responsibility to his country and his countrymen. One
must instead act as a parent would: he must do whatever is in his power to cause the
change he wishes to see. Disappointment must be met with resiliency.

Section B: Beerbohm on Complicity
In his book In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, Eric Beerbohm of Harvard
University discusses the complex relationship between citizen and state in a
representative democracy. Though a representative democracy is less ideal than a
direct one, the responsibilities of citizenship are the same. To him, the democratic
citizen is bound to the state at birth, even though he doesn’t necessarily choose to be
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—“All of us were born into a political structure that we did not preselect.”28 Just because
one doesn’t chose which state he is born into doesn’t mean he can simply disavow his
citizenship. Not every responsibility is volunteered for or agreed to, some are just
inherent. Take morality for example. There are certain moral responsibilities the
individual has when it comes to interacting with others that are unspoken, unenforced,
and may be difficult to carry out. For instance, someone is obligated to report a crime or
prevent injustices from being committed. If that person were to neglect those
responsibilities simply by claiming that he didn’t consent to take them on, he would no
doubt still be wrong, if not complicit in the crime for doing nothing to stop it.
This idea of moral complicity is central to Beerbohm’s piece. The question posed
in the book’s short back-cover synopsis is, “When a government in a democracy acts in
our name, are we, as citizens, responsible for those acts?” And his answer is simple:
yes. Early on, he makes the assertion: “there are responsibilities of the democratic
citizen that are nondelegable… I take complicity to be the professional hazard of
democratic citizenship.”29 That is to say, accountability on the part of the individual
citizen for the acts of his state is implicit within a democratic system. His explanation is
that since citizens in a democracy are causally bound to political outcomes, whether
they actively contribute to them or not, they bear responsibility for both the just and the
unjust actions of their state.
It may seem like a stretch in a representative democracy to consider voters
legitimate agents because of how far removed they are from the actual decision-making
Beerbohm, Eric Anthony. In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2015. 16.
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process, but Beerbohm reasons that when voters elect individuals to represent their
interests, they become morally liable for the actions those individuals take in their name.
He posits, “Because our primary mode of political agency is mediated, we are
vulnerable to the charge of participating in the wrongdoing of another.”30 But are
individuals who voted against a specific candidate still guilty when that candidate takes
office and goes on to commit injustice? Beerbohm says yes. He rationalizes this on the
basis of association and mutual benefit. As supporters and recipients of the state, each
and every citizen shares the burden of accountability for its actions. Complicity is
completely unavoidable, and he is right to point this out.
Though it may not sound fair, it is rationally sound. However, the fact that a
representative could possibly misrepresent the interests of his constituents points to the
fundamental flaw of representative democracy: ones will cannot be delegated. It’s been
said before that the only adequate representation and self-representation and this is
essential if the individual is to maintain his freedom and sovereignty. The disadvantages
of representative democracy will be discussed further shortly, but for now it must suffice
since it is the closest thing to an ideal government that exists today.
On the assumption that responsibility for the injustices of ones state is inevitable,
one must do whatever is in his power to counteract these injustices. The principle cause
of injustice is a lack of compassion. Without compassion, nothing is to stop a state from
committing ethical crimes against another in order to advance its own agenda.
Compassion must prevail because it is in man’s nature for it to. But in order for it to be
able to, each citizen must fulfill his responsibility to his state and to his countrymen by
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engaging in the political realm. To simply remove oneself from politics in the hopes of
disassociating from the wrong-doers is morally impossible. This is like the example of a
person witnessing a crime and doing nothing. Of course he is not actively participating
in the crime, but he is at the very least an accessory to it.

Section C: The “Moral Voter Complex” and Deliberation
Standing in the way of political engagement is what Beerbohm calls the “Moral
Voter Complex”, which appears to be a struggle between morality and rationality within
the voting individual. In a democratic system, the effect that one person can have on the
outcome of a major decision is minuscule. When the typical citizen comes to realize this
fact, he may be dissuaded from voting, or worse, disillusioned with the democratic
system entirely. It seems that the individual is helpless in the face of injustice.
Beerbohm explains:
Once prudential citizens recognize that their ballot will be
ineffectual, they will decide not only that participating in the polls
flies in the face of rationality. Expending any epistemic effort into
their vote is equally pointless. For it is nearly certain that any
mental energy and time they invest will have no payoff. They lack
incentives to lead an active mental life about politics, save the small
minority who share an aesthetic appreciation for the topic.31
It may be rational for one to conclude that his vote will have no significant effect on the
result of an election or the trajectory of his state’s policies, but this does not mean it is
acceptable to abandon the political system to which he belongs. Rationality alone will
not provide the incentive necessary for meaningful political engagement, which does not
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entail only voting occasionally for representatives in local or national elections. There is
a moral component to democratic participation that is fundamental to the proper
functioning of any legitimate state.
This moral component is ultimately what must prevail over rationality in
Beerbohm’s view. He begins his line of inquiry by asking, “Do citizens have moral
reason to aim to reform unjust institutions, given their diminishing chances of playing a
decisive role?”32 This question of morality gets to the heart of the voter’s inner conflict.
On the one hand, the voter recognizes that his power to independently enact change on
the scale that he wishes to is insignificant. On the other hand though, he has an ethical
responsibility to fight injustice that he perceives in the actions of his state. Since each is
essentially guilty by association, “citizens have reason to reduce their “complicity
footprint” through more active participation.”33 What this means is to take active
measures to try and neutralize the injustices committed by the state in the name of its
citizens. Political activism, increases in voter turnout, and mediums of social and
political dialogue are all demonstrations of the type of response to institutional wrongdoing that Beerbohm wishes to see.34
The “Moral Voter Complex” requires that one transcend his rational response—
that the act of voting, when taken individually, is almost entirely inconsequential—and
act from a place of moral necessity. But what morals is Beerbohm most concerned with?
The Aristotelian virtues of wisdom, temperance, and justice? Does he mean the
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contemporary liberal virtues of egalitarianism and human rights? Is there an inherent
moral standard, separate from either of these doctrines that he believes every
democratic citizen should maintain? The answer is complicated. Beerbohm accepts that
the typical citizen has many responsibilities outside of his political ones, and as a result,
he cannot be reasonably expected to dedicate the same amount of time to political
deliberation (a concept emphasized by many political theorists) as a career politician,
for instance. This means that, from his view, citizens need not have a comprehensive
understanding of ethics or political doctrine. Most of the work that needs to be done by
the democratic citizen is described as “cognitive”.
Though his standard for deliberation is markedly lower than political theorists
typically advocate, the process of deliberation is still crucial to proper political
engagement. And while this deliberation does not depend on lofty or hyper-rational
virtues, it does still depend on a couple more accessible ones. These are justice and the
common good. He asserts, “All members of a democracy have cognitive responsibilities
—moral obligations to form and manage their convictions about justice and the common
good.”35 ‘Common good’, in particular, is a quite vague idea, but this is the way
Beerbohm intends it to be. Justice, too, is a concept that can be taken in many ways.
The broad spectrum on which different people may choose to position
themselves in relation to these two values is indicative of the plurality of perspectives
necessitated by Beerbohm’s unique concept of deliberation. To him, deliberation is an
innately interactive process that depends on a variety of inputs in order to create a more
inclusive dialogue about political issues. One cannot simply deliberate by himself in the
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privacy of his home. It must be done publicly where others can listen and respond, and
each person must be willing to have their minds changed. Justice and common good
mean something different to everyone, and thus they are accessible to everyone, even
those without political or philosophical expertise. By leveling the political playing field, so
to speak, each citizen is free to exercise their own unique voice and secure their agency
and sovereignty.
Justice and common good are communally oriented values. The former deals
with relations between individuals or groups of people in terms of right and wrong and
the latter aims at communal benefit. Though Beerbohm does not discuss it in these
terms, both seem to be closely related to the idea of compassion. Compassion, as has
been stated repeatedly, is what naturally inclines human beings toward one another in a
peaceful and fair fashion. The Rousseauan maxim grows from a desire for the common
good and implicitly calls for justice in interpersonal endeavors. Beerbohm’s deliberating
voter is quite similar to the proud and compassionate political actor discussed
previously in that the goal of each’s actions within the political realm is the same. Ethical
responsibility takes the place of pride and compassion in motivating and conditioning
political action. That said, there are a few significant differences between the connection
the proud and compassionate political actor has with the state and the connection the
morally obligated voter has with it.

Section D: Selective Citizenship and the Faults of Representative Democracy
Beerbohm’s account of complicity and moral responsibility paints a clear and
effective picture of what it means to be a citizen in a democracy, but this picture is
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incomplete. Much has been said about bearing responsibility for, and responding to,
injustices by the state, but little has been said about how the relationship between
citizen and state is actually characterized.
To begin, Beerbohm has the individual citizen caring for the state only when it is
in peril. While he accepts that there are those who will always involve themselves in
politics out of personal interest, he denies that citizens have a responsibility to engage
continuously in politics, “There is, I think, little reason to think that our participatory
obligations are constant… It is mistaken to claim that we have a moral duty to vote—full
stop.”36 The morally responsible voter responds to actions by the state that he finds
disagreeable, but otherwise withholds his input. Political engagement in these terms
essentially takes the form of damage control. One chooses to take political action
because he feels his will is being misrepresented and he wishes to set the record
straight. This response might seem commendable because it is a productive one that
re-engages him with his state, as opposed to turning his back on it and pleading
innocence for its wrongdoings. But this is still an inherently selfish act, motivated more
by a fear of complicity than by any real obligation to the state.
Where is the pride? Where is the compassion? There is no pride, except perhaps
pride in oneself for making what he perceives to be an upstanding decision in the face
of injustice. There is no compassion, because what motivates his action is not genuine
care for others or for his community, but a refusal to be seen as having a lower moral
standard than he thinks he has. This rationale, and the way Beerbohm discusses the
citizen’s obligations, serve to divorce the citizen from the state in a way that they
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shouldn't be. He depicts them as two separate entities that engage with one another
mostly just when they are at odds. Instead of political action being motivated by
occasional shame, it should be an unceasing commitment to mold the state into a voice
for its people. The will of the state should be indistinguishable from the will of its
citizens, because through proper and consistent political action the state becomes a
medium for self-identity, not something for identities to be compared against.
Political involvement must be continuous if the state is to fulfill the role it was
created for, and that is to be a constantly evolving expression of its citizens’ will and
character. In his Social Contract, Rousseau describes the individual as an “indivisible
part of the whole.”37 The most essential aspect of the implicit agreement made between
people upon entering into civil society is that this society be an honest and consistent
reflection of its people—all of them. Unwillingness to participate in the political life of the
state must be seen as a disservice to oneself and to ones fellow citizens. Every citizen
plays an irreplaceable role in creating the nature of the state, which in turn helps to
define each of its citizens. Political action is the vehicle of ones sovereignty, and without
a political voice, one simply consents to be ruled. This would not have been sufficient to
abandon the State of Nature for.
This criticism of Beerbohm is most likely rooted in the fact that his doctrine is
based on a system of representative democracy and not a direct one. Representative
government entails a degree of alienation between citizen and state because of the
individual’s inability to engage directly with the decision-making process. Forced to act
through mediators, it is impossible for citizens to feel a personal stake in the state and
37
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the actions it takes. This personal stake can only be developed through meaningful
interaction. It comes when the individual feels a sense of ownership for his state
because of the role he played in making it what it is, like the way a business owner feels
in growing his business from the ground up or the way a sculptor feels in finishing a
piece. This sense of ownership and belonging leads to the development of pride for
ones state. This pride binds the citizen to the state, in such a way that he could never
leave its governance in the hands of another. The removal of delegations would not
suddenly make everyone’s vote count for more, but it would increase accountability and
decrease complicity among citizens.

Section E: Sovereignty, Agency, and Personal Stake
Representative governments are unable to meaningfully represent the wills of
their citizens. It is impossible even for those in elected positions to do this, and it is
through no fault of their own. This is because no one person can know or adequately
express the wills of many, because each is a conditioned by a unique identity with a
personal connection to the state and his peers. Even in the case of consensus, the wills
of each citizen cannot be delegated. It is through political involvement, through the
democratic process, that a citizen lays claim to his agency and individuality. It is how he
stakes his claim to his state, making it his. Someone could go through their entire life
living within a country and never form such a profound connection because he was
never able to engage with his state meaningfully and without restraint. He was never
made to experience his political agency and sovereignty, and as a result he is inclined
to think of the state as something that controls him or inhibits his free will.
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If one does not partake in the political life of his state, no matter the system of
government, he might as well be living under a monarch or dictator. If anyone other than
himself makes decisions on his behalf, he is not free. Freedom entails more than just
freedom to act however one chooses. One must also be free of things that may
influence his thought or his actions. Mill was the first to posit that freedom must also
mean the absence of coercion, arguing that coercion by the masses toward the
individual is only permissible in the event that said individual is a clearly perceivable
threat to others. Even in the rare circumstance of a true consensus of the people, it is
not justified for them to express or impose their beliefs in such a way that it influences
others. He explains:
Let us suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one
with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion
unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I
deny the right of people to exercise such coercion, either by
themselves or by their government. This power is illegitimate… If all
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person
were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in
silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be
justified in silencing mankind.38

Mill is right, of course, in maintaining that the masses have no more right to speak for
the individual as the individual has to speak for the masses. One might attempt to justify
exclusion from political life by affirming that freedom of action also allows for inaction.
While this is the case in nearly every scenario, it cannot be the case when it comes to
exercising ones vote or political voice. Without these, the individual puts himself at the
mercy of his peers, who are unlikely to try to do him harm, but will coerce him toward
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actions that he may not have chosen for himself. In any case, he submits himself to live
in a society that he has no hand in shaping and no voice of his own.
That one consent, either tacitly or otherwise, to live within a state is completely
insufficient in ensuring its legitimacy. It is irrational to claim, as Hobbes does, that
people ought to submit to rule by others as a way of ensuring their survival. It is in
man’s most basic nature to experience freedom and self-determination as he would in
the State of Nature, where the only natural law governing him is compassion. On the
assumption that the State of Nature is not violent and deplorable, one must actually
have an incentive to abandon it in favor of civil society. People can only be expected to
consent to a society in which both their liberty and sovereignty remain intact. But, ironic
as it may sound, these two things can only be protected through consistent and willful
political action. It is through political action that one self-represents and exercises his
sovereignty. Personal liberty, too, is at risk when one refuses to engage in political life
because to not do so is to consent to the will of others. Locke describes liberty within
the state as follows:
In political society, liberty consists of being under no other
lawmaking power except that established by consent in the
commonwealth. People are free from the dominion of any will or
legal restraint apart from that enacted by their own constituted
lawmaking power according to the trust put in it.39
This definition, though not intended for a direct democracy, represents the relationship
between the citizen and the ideal state. The individual should at no point be under the
power of a law that he did not have a hand in creating. This would essentially be like
39
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consenting to a foreign legislature, since he was uninvolved in the decision-making
process and the law is not reflective of his nature. What Locke calls the commonwealth
should instead be considered the amalgamation of each citizens’ will, which each
enacts continuously alongside his fellow citizens. The law should never feel like an
imposition, it should feel like an agreement, and if ever it doesn’t feel this way, then it is
unjust.

Conclusion

Since society is formed by the consent of the people, its authority should rest in
their hands. The state ought to be established with mankind’s natural tendencies in
mind if it is to legitimately represent its citizens. Since the most fundamental tendencies
among them are pride and compassion, then the state must harness these to their
greatest potential. If the state is not organized according to man’s nature, then it will
inspire resentment and limit the degree to which citizens can connect with their state.
The state should not be seen as something that imposes itself on its citizens or controls
them from afar, it should be seen as an extension of its citizens that grows and evolves
alongside them. This cannot occur by way of delegation; each citizen must engage
directly with the decision-making process. Pride is what inspires political activity,
because if one feels pride for something, he will do his best to sustain and improve it. In
an ideal state, each citizen feels a personal connection to the state and experiences
pride in its flourishing, the same way a gardener feels pride in watching his garden
grow. Just like the gardener, the citizen will want to make his state as good as it can
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possibly be. Compassion, on the other hand, must not only be considered the origin of
society, since it is what naturally inclines people toward one another peacefully, but also
the force that guides political activity and keeps pride from becoming destructive.
In an era when Americans feel increasingly alienated from the state, it is more
important than ever that political engagement take place. It seems strange that in an
age of unparalleled independence and individualism, people are content to let decisions
be made for them. The problem is one of identity. The identity of the individual does not
align with the perceived identity of the state—they represent different things. But this
does not need to be the case. Representative democracy is far from ideal, but even
within the American system there exist avenues for citizens to engage directly with the
political process. It is incumbent on each American to use whatever means are at their
disposal to cause the change they wish to see, whether this be voting, protesting, or
petitioning. Of these, the latter two require no mediation. It is only through this kind of
activity that the modern citizen can build a healthy and meaningful relationship to the
state. If national pride is not enough to promote political engagement, then compassion
for others should be. It is time for every individual to be made accountable. To
disengage oneself from his country is irrational and morally unacceptable, but it speaks
to a failure on the part of both the citizen and the state. It is the citizen’s role to
contribute to the identity of the state, but it is equally important that the state provide the
means by which its citizens can do this.
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